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The supertask of an infinite lottery
Timber Kerkvliet
Abstract
We mathematically model the supertask, introduced by Hansen (2014;
2015), in which an infinity of gods together select a random natural num-
ber by each randomly removing a finite number of balls from an urn, leav-
ing one final ball. We show that this supertask is highly underdetermined,
i.e. there are many scenarios consistent with the supertask. In particular
we show that the notion of uniformity for finitely additive probability mea-
sures on the natural numbers emerging from this supertask is unreasonably
weak.
Keywords: Supertask · Infinite lottery · Uniform probability · Finite addi-
tivity
1 Introduction
A supertask is a task that consists of countably many tasks that are carried out
within a finite time interval. Even if every task of a supertask is unambiguously
described, it is possible that it is not uniquely determined what will happen
when the supertask is performed. In general, to determine which scenarios are
consistent with a description of a certain supertask, we need a (mathematical)
model of the supertask that specifies all the (a priori) possible scenarios and
the constraints on those scenarios as dictated by the supertask. Within such
a model, one can try to determine the set of all scenarios consistent with the
supertask, i.e. the set of possible scenarios that satisfy the contraints.
Hansen (2014; 2015) introduces a supertask in which an infinity of gods
together select a random natural number by each randomly removing a finite
number of balls from an urn, leaving one final ball. Every task consists of ran-
domly removing a finite number of balls and hence is probabilistic in nature.
This means that by the very nature of the supertask, what will happen is unde-
termined. However, the probability of what happens in every task, given what
has happened up to that task, is completely determined. Therefore, we consider
finitely additive probability measures of outcomes, which we call probability
functions from now on, as scenarios rather than outcomes themselves and then
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ask the question what scenarios are consistent with the supertask. (In Section 2
we explain why we use probability functions instead of probability measures)
At face value, it seems perfectly reasonable to use this supertask to give a
definition of ‘uniformity’ for probability functions on the natural numbers, by
calling all probability functions of the final ball consistent with the supertask
‘uniform’. Hansen conflates this notion of uniformity that emerges from the
supertask itself, with notions of uniformity proposed on completely different
grounds by mathematicians.1 It is a priori not clear that any of these proposed
notions is equivalentwith the notion of uniformity that emerges from the super-
task. Amathematical model followed by an analysis of that model, is necessary
to conclude that.
In this paper, we present a mathematical model for the supertask of Hansen
to study the notion of uniformity that emerges from the supertask. Within this
model, we only insist on the finite additivity of candidate probability functions.
We prove that given any p ∈ [0, 1] and set A ⊆ N such that A and Ac are infi-
nite, there is a probability function consistent with the supertask that assigns
probability p to the final ball being in A. We also show that if A or Ac is finite,
then every probability function consistent with the supertask has to assign re-
spectively probability 0 or 1 to the final ball being in A.
Our analysis shows that the description of the supertask is highly underde-
termined: there are many probability functions consistent with the supertask,
all giving different probabilities of the final ball being in certain sets. As a con-
sequence, we cannot speak of this supertask as having an uniquely determined
underlying probability function. The underdetermination makes the notion of
uniformity emerging from the supertask unreasonably weak: it, for example,
violates that every residue classmodulom (e.g. in casem = 2 the odd and even
numbers) has probability 1/m. Hence it casts doubt on calling the supertask a
‘uniform’ lottery on N.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give our own short
description of the supertask of Hansen and describe in words the results we
present in Section 3, including some intuitions behind the proof. This enables
a reader who is not familiar with the mathematical concepts to skip Section 3,
which contains the mathematical result in full technical detail. In Section 4 we
give our reflection on the results.
2 The supertask
We start to give our own compromised description of the supertask:
1Examples of notions of uniformity proposed bymathematicians are found in de Finetti S (1974),
Schirokauer & Kadane (2007), Wenmackers & Horsten (2013) and Kerkvliet & Meester (2015).
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An infinite number of gods, all indentified by an unique natural
number, gather to hold a lottery. To do that, for every natural num-
ber k, they produce a ball of size 2−k (so that the total volume of the
balls is finite) with the number k and put them in an urn of finite
size. Then they follow the following instruction: at time tk = 1/k
god k takes the urn. If god k finds k+1 balls in the urn, he randomly
removes one. If god k not finds k+1 balls in the urn, he first empties
the urn and then puts balls 1 to k in the urn.2
In the version of Hansen god k removes 2k−1 balls. We simplified this by letting
each god remove only one ball. This only changes the supertask cosmetically,
because the only crucial part is that every god removes a finite number of balls.
More precisely, the task of god k in the description of Hansen (reducing the
number of balls from 2k to 2k−1) is precisely the task that gods 2k − 1 to 2k−1
perform together in our description. The main reason for this adjustement is
that it turns out to simplify the mathematics in Section 3.
We write an outcome of the process as {3}, {3, 7}, {3, 4, 7}, . . ., where every
set in the sequence adds one (new) natural number to its precursor and every
natural number is added at some point in the sequence. The first set represents
the set of balls after god 1 has removed a ball, followed by the set of balls after
god 2 has removed a ball, etcetera. So in this case god 2 found balls 3, 4 and 7
and removed ball 4. After that, god 1 removed ball 7 leaving ball 3 as the final
ball. On the outcome space consisting of all such sequences, we want to define
our probability function. The constraint on this probability function that we get
from the supertask is that for every k, the conditional probability of the set of
balls after god k being in some collection S (consisting of sets of size k), given
that after god k+1 there are precisely j balls that upon removal give an element
of S, is j/(k + 1).
We have two arguments for only requiring a probability function instead
of a probability measure, which is σ-additive. In the first place, we think a
probability function on an infinite space should not necessarily have to assign
zero probability to a disjoint union of infinitely many sets of probability zero,
if the union is so big that it has the same cardinality as the outcome space. This
is, for example, a crucial property of Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]: every single
point has probability zero, but intervals, while being unions infinitely many of
points, have positive probabilities.3 Since σ-additivity forces all disjoint unions
2The explicit instruction for the case that god k finds not k + 1 balls is given to ensure that this
part of the instruction is actually never used: since the instruction is also followed by god k + 1,
god k necesarrily finds k + 1 balls in the urn.
3Notice that Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] does not assign a positive probability to every uncount-
able set: the Cantor set has probability zero while being uncountable. The point here is that it
assigns positive probability to some uncountable sets.
3
of countablymany sets of probability zero to be zero, we can only guarantee the
preservation of this property, if we do not insist on σ-additivity.4
In addition to the above, there is also the following argument that uses the
supertask itself as an argument against σ-additivity, analogue to the argument
of Laraudogoita (2014). Any probability function consistent with the super-
task, has to assign probability zero to the event that the final ball is ball k. Any
σ-additive probability function, however, cannot assign zero probability to this
event for every k: because there are countably many balls and since the out-
come space is the disjoint union of all these events, it then also should have
probability zero, which would contradict that the outcome space has probabil-
ity 1 by definition. So if wewant that our model to allow at least one probability
function to be consistent with the supertask, we cannot insist on σ-additivity.
Within our model, we prove that for any p ∈ [0, 1] and any set A ⊆ N such
that A and Ac are infinite, there is a probability function satisfying the con-
straint, assigning probability p to the final ball being in A. To show the idea
behind the proof, we fix the outcome
{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . . (1)
Consider the probability function that assigns probability 1/2 to the two out-
comes that are identical to our fixed outcome up to god 1, i.e.
{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . and
{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . .
(2)
Since what happens up to god 1 is deterministic ({1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, ...with proba-
bility 1) under this probability function, the constraint for k = 1 entails that god
1 removes ball 1 or 2 both with probility 1/2, which is exactlywhat happens. So
this probability function satisfies the constraint for k = 1, but not for all other
k. Nowwe consider the probability function that assigns probability 1/6 to the
outcomes that are identical to our fixed outcome up to god 2, i.e.
{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . ,
{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . ,
{2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . ,
{3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . ,
{1}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . and
{3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, . . . .
(3)
4There is a controversy among philosophers about the type of additivity that should be required
for a probability measure. We take the side of finite additivity in this debate, much in line with the
critique of σ-additivity by de Finetti S (1974). Notable arguments for σ-additivity in this debate are
found in the work of, for example, Skyrims (1992) and Williamson (1999).
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What happens up to god 2 is now deterministic and since every possibility for
the actions of gods 1 and 2 have the same probability, the constraint is satisfied
for k = 1 and k = 2. By continuing this process, we get probability functions
that satisfy the constraint for more and more k. In this way, in the limit, we
get a probability function that satisfies the constraint for every k (see Section 3
for the precise construction of this limit probability function). If what happens
up to god k is deterministic and everything after that happens with the same
probability, then the probability of the final ball being even is given by the frac-
tion of even balls after god k + 1 has removed a ball. Since our fixed outcome
is {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, . . ., the probability of the final ball being even converges
to 1/2 as k grows to infinity. Hence the probability that the final ball is even is
1/2.
The crux is that we can start with any fixed outcome. Suppose we want a
probability function that assigns probability 1/3 to the final ball being even.
Then we construct an appropriate fixed outcome in the following way. We
start with {1}. Because the fraction of even numbers is now 0, we add an even
number for the next element of the sequence: {1}, {1, 2}. The fraction of even
numbers is now 1/2, which is greater than 1/3, so we add an odd number:
{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}. Now the fraction of even numbers is exactly 1/3, so we can
add any number: {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}. Because the fraction is now
again greater than 1/3, we add an odd number and so on. So if we fix the out-
come
{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7},
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11}, . . . ,
(4)
then the probability of the final ball being even converges to 1/3 instead of 1/2.
The same works for any given p ∈ [0, 1] other than 1/3. Further, the set of even
numbers is not special here. The only thing we use to construct the appropriate
outcome is that at any time we can add an even or an odd number, in other
words: both the set of even numbers and its complement have to be infinite.
Hence the same works for any infinite set of natural numbers with an infinite
complement, as desired.
To see what happens for finite set of natural numbers, we look at the proba-
bility of the final ball being a specific ball, for example ball 7. Suppose that ball
7 is still in the urn when god k takes the urn. For ball 7 to make it to the end,
god k to 1 have to remove some other ball than 7. They do that with respectively
probability k/(k+1) to 1/2, making the probability that 7 is the remaining ball
k
k + 1
·
k − 1
k
· . . . ·
2
3
·
1
2
=
1
k + 1
. (5)
So the probability ball 7 survives from god k to 1, is 1/(k + 1). For ball 7 to
be the remaining ball, however, it has to survive all gods, which implies that
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the probability of that happening has to be smaller than 1/(k + 1) for every
k. Hence the probability the final ball is ball 7 can only be zero. In the same
way, any specific ball has probability zero of being the final ball. And since our
probability function is finitely additive, the probability of the final ball being
from any finite set of balls, is zero.
3 The mathematical model
In this section, wemake everythingmathematically precise. To do that, we start
with some definitions. Write for k ∈ N
Nk := {A ⊆ N : |A| = k}
Ωk := {(Bk, Bk+1, . . .) : Bj ∈ Nj , Bj ⊂ Bj+1 and ∪j Bj = N}.
(6)
Elements of Ωk represent what happens up until god k. The space Ω := Ω1 is
our outcome space. On this space, we define the following two functions. For
B = (B1, B2, ...) ∈ Ω with B1 = {n}, we define
Hk(B) := (Bk, Bk+1, . . .) ∈ Ωk+1
R(B) := n.
(7)
The function Hk maps an outcome to what happened up until god k and R
gives us the remaining ball at the end of the process.
For B = (Bk+1, Bk+2, ...) ∈ Ωk+1, S ⊆ Ωk and 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1we set
N(S;B)) := |{b ∈ Bk+1 : (Bk+1 \ {b}, Bk+1, Bk+2, . . .) ∈ S}|
Pj(S) := {B ∈ Ωk+1 : N(S;B) = j} ⊆ Ωk+1
(8)
In words, the set Pj(S) gives us everything that can happen up until god k + 1
such that there are precisely j of the k + 1 balls that upon removal give us an
element of S.
We consider the measure space (Ω,P(Ω)). On this measure space we con-
sider probability functions as candidates. The constraint on probability func-
tion µ that we obtain from the description of the supertask is that for every k,
S ⊆ Ωk and T ⊆ Pj(S) such that µ(Hk+1 ∈ T ) > 0we have
µ(Hk ∈ S|Hk+1 ∈ T ) =
j
k + 1
. (9)
We note that using (9) we can determine µ(Hk ∈ S|Hk+1 ∈ T ) for every k,
S ⊆ Ωk and T ⊆ Ωk+1 such that µ(Hk+1 ∈ T ) > 0, by writing
µ(Hk ∈ S|Hk+1 ∈ T ) =
k+1∑
j=0
µ(Hk ∈ S;Hk+1 ∈ T ∩ Pj(S))
µ(Hk+1 ∈ T )
=
k+1∑
j=1
j
k + 1
µ(Hk+1 ∈ T ∩ Pj(S))
µ(Hk+1 ∈ T )
.
(10)
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We write M for the set of probability functions that satisfy (9) and prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let A ⊆ N. Then
{µ(R ∈ A) : µ ∈M} =


{0} if A is finite
{1} if Ac is finite
[0, 1] otherwise
. (11)
We present the proof of Theorem 1 in three steps.
Step 1 We construct for every Z ∈ Ω, a probability function αZ ∈ M based
on Z .
To construct a probability function such that (9) is satisfied, we fix a Z :=
(Z1, Z2, Z3, . . .) ∈ Ω and set
Fn := {Hn = (Zn, Zn+1, . . .)} ⊆ Ω. (12)
For S ⊆ Ω = Ω1 we define the sequence x(S) ∈ [0, 1]
∞ by
xn(S) :=
|S ∩ Fn|
|Fn|
=
|S ∩ Fn|
n!
, (13)
which gives the density of S with respect to Fn. Now, we let n go to infinity.
To do that, we extend the limit operator on all convergent sequences to a linear
operator L on all bounded sequences. Such an extension can be constructed by
using a free ultrafilter onN. The existence of such a free ultrafilter is guaranteed
by the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem, which can not be proven in ZF set theory,
but isweaker than the axiomof choice (Halpern 1964).5 WedefineαZ : P(Ω)→
[0, 1] by
αZ(S) := L(x(S)). (14)
Now we show that αZ ∈ M. For S ⊆ Ωk, T ⊆ Pj(S) and k < n, we have
j|{Hk+1 ∈ T } ∩ Fn| =
∑
B∈T
N(S,B)|{Hk+1 = B} ∩ Fn|
=
∑
B′∈S
∑
B∈T
N({B′}, B)|{Hk+1 = B} ∩ Fn|
=
∑
B′∈S
∑
B∈T
(k + 1)|{Hk = B
′;Hk+1 = B} ∩ Fn|
= (k + 1)|{Hk ∈ S;Hk+1 ∈ T } ∩ Fn|.
(15)
5The existence of a atomfree or nonprincipal (i.e. every singleton has measure zero) probability
function defined on the power set of N cannot be established in ZF alone (Solovay 1970). Conse-
quently, a version of the axiom of choice is always necessary to construct an element ofM.
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Dividing by n!(k + 1) on both sides in (15) we find that
xn({Hk ∈ S;Hk+1 ∈ T }) =
j
k + 1
xn({Hk+1 ∈ T }). (16)
Since L is linear, we get that
αZ (Hk ∈ S;Hk+1 ∈ T )
αZ(Hk+1 ∈ T )
=
j
k + 1
(17)
for every k, S ⊆ Ωk and T ⊆ Pj(S) with αZ(Hk+1 ∈ T ) > 0, which is what we
wanted to show.
Step 2 We show that for every infinite A ⊆ N such that Ac is also infinite
and every p ∈ [0, 1] there is a Z ∈ Ω such that αZ(R ∈ A) = p.
Let A ⊆ N be such that both A and Ac are infinite. Let p ∈ [0, 1] be given. If
we choose Z ∈ Ω such that
|Zk ∩A|
k
→ p (18)
as k → ∞, then αZ(R ∈ A) = p. We construct Z by recursion, using as basic
rule that we add an element from A if the density is too high and add an ele-
ment from Ac if the density is too low. To make sure that we add every natural
number somewehere in the process and thus Z ∈ Ω, we make one exception to
this rule: for every j, we add an element fromA in the j2-th step and an element
from Ac in the j2 + 1-th step. This exception, however, does not influence the
limit density we obtain since the fraction of square numbers in [0, k] converges
to zero as k →∞. We set
Z1 := {1}
ak := minA ∩ Z
c
k
bk := minA
c ∩ Zck
Zk+1 :=


Zk ∪ {ak} if k 6∈ {j2, j2 + 1} for some j and
|Zk∩A|
k
≤ p
Zk ∪ {bk} if k 6∈ {j2, j2 + 1} for some j and
|Zk∩A|
k
> p
Zk ∪ {ak} if k = j2 for some j
Zk ∪ {bk} if k = j2 + 1 for some j
.
(19)
Notice that ak and bk are well defined for every k because A and A
c are both
infinite. Also note that Z = (Z1, Z2, Z3, ...) ∈ Ω and (18) is satisfied, as desired.
Step 3 We show that for all µ ∈M and finite A ⊆ N we have µ(R ∈ A) = 0.
Let a ∈ N and µ ∈ M 6= ∅. If we take
Sk := {(Bk, Bk+1, . . .) ∈ Ωk : a ∈ Bk}, (20)
we get from (9) that
µ(Hk ∈ Sk) =
k
k + 1
µ(Hk+1 ∈ Sk+1). (21)
This implies that µ(R = a) = µ(H1 ∈ S1) =
1
k
µ(Hk ∈ Sk) for every k, so
µ(R = a) ≤ 1
k
for every k. Hence µ(R = a) = 0. Since µ is finitely additive, we
have µ(R ∈ A) = 0 for every finite A ⊆ N. 
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4 Discussion
We have given a mathematical model for the supertask of Hansen. Our conclu-
sions depend of course on the choice for this model: another model could give
different results. We think, however, that the presentmodel is not controversial.
From our model, we have concluded that there are many probability functions
that are consistent with the supertask. We have expressed this indeterminacy
in terms of the different probabilities the probability functions assign to the fi-
nal ball being in some subset A ⊆ N. If A is infinite and its complement is also
infinite, then any probability p is assigned to the final ball being in A by some
probability function consistent with the supertask.
This conclusion shows that the description of the supertask as presented,
just does not give us enough information to say anything about the probabil-
ity of the final ball being in a set of the type described above. As a conse-
quence, we should be very careful about this indeterminacy when thinking
about the supertask. At one point, Hansen mentions the ‘emperical distribu-
tion’ obtained by the gods if they keep repeating the supertask. Assuming there
is the same underlying probability function every time they perform the su-
pertask, of course one can, at least in theory, estimate this probability function
through performing experiments. However, the description of the supertask
does not give enough information to decide what that underlying probability
function is.
One would hesitate to call a probability function assigning probability 1 to
the even numbers and probability 0 to the odd numbers, a ‘uniform’ probability
function. A reasonable notion of uniformity at least includes that every residue
class modulo m has probability 1/m (giving for m = 2 that the even numbers
have probability 1/2).6 Our model shows, however, that the final ball being
even can get any probability. Thismeans that the notion of uniformity emerging
from the supertask is weaker than any reasonable notion of uniformity.
Our analysis also shows that for any n ∈ N, a probability function consistent
with the supertask necessarily has to assign probability zero to the final ball
being n. Altough this property of being atomfree is not a reasonable notion of
‘uniformity’, it is some form of ‘fairness’ nonetheless. This form of fairness is
sufficient for the point Hansen wants to make about the supertask, namely that
given any possible final ball k, the probability is 1 that the final ball is bigger
than k. In other words: the final ball seems always unexpectedly low. This is
certainly not an inconsistency, but Hansen does call it an ‘absurdity’.
We do not want to present an argument here about whether this is indeed
an absurdity or not, but only to add clarity to that discussion by a proper analy-
sis of the supertask. We do, however, want to point out that the alleged absurd
6This is the weakest notion of uniformity considered by Schirokauer & Kadane (2007).
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property of the probability function on the final ball is not unique. Also it is
not restricted to probability functions. A typical σ-additive probability mea-
sure with this property is the following. Let ω1 be the first uncountable ordinal
number and let F be the σ-algebra of subsets F ⊆ ω1 such that either F or F c
is countable. Let µ : F → [0, 1] be given by
µ(F ) :=
{
0 if F is countable
1 if F is uncountable
. (22)
Then µ is a σ-additive probability measure. If µ models a lottery on ω1, then
completely analogous to the situation on N, for any outcome α ∈ ω1 we have
µ({β ∈ ω1 : β > α}) = 1. Accepting the Axiom of Choice, this property
also translates to picking a random number from [0, 1]. By the well ordering
theorem, there exists a well ordering  of [0, 1]. If we model the experiment
with Lebesgue measure λ on [0, 1], for any outcome x ∈ [0, 1], we again have
λ({y ∈ [0, 1] : y ≻ x}) = 1.
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